At 11:55 16/07/2019  Tuesday, Stefan Eissing wrote:
A user of my Apache ACME client asked about a feature where the security 
implications are not clear to me:

- he has several server instances that may receive the CA's http-01 challenge 
request. He therefore would like all servers to answer to all challenges like the 
solution proposed by acme.sh: 
<https://github.com/Neilpang/acme.sh/wiki/Stateless-Mode>

server {
....
  location ~ ^/\.well-known/acme-challenge/([-_a-zA-Z0-9]+)$ {
    default_type text/plain;
    return 200 "$1.6fXAG9VyG0IahirPEU2ZerUtItW2DHzDzD9wZaEKpqd";
  }

which sends the thumbnail back to anyone asking. Is this an example to follow? 
It feels very open...
I can't find anything terribly wrong with it. The two most important things are (a) it binds to the account key fingerprint, so it doesn't let some other person get a certificate for you, and (b) it filters by a narrow set of valid characters, which prevents this from being an XSS vector (https://labs.detectify.com/2018/09/04/xss-using-quirky-implementations-of-acme-http-01/).

Still, it seems like other clients get along fine with a stateful mode, which narrows the realm of possible unforeseen problems with this approach.

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