I don't think it's the CA's job to dictate policy in this area. -Ekr
On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:26 PM, Dr. Pala <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi all, > > I have a small question about the I-D. In particular, it seems to me that > this proposal circumvents any limitation on the effective lifetime of a > short-lived-cert's keypair. From a cryptographic standpoint of view, it is > good practice to impose strict lifetimes on keys (i.e., usually via > validity periods in certificates) to limit the issue of successful attacks > on the crypto scheme (e.g., key factorization). This proposal would > de-facto remove this property by adopting re-issuing instead of re-keying > when renewing a certificate. > > Although the CA might be able to track the usage of a key from the initial > CSRs, the automatic issuance of the certificate itself without the > constraints of the key longevity seems quite dangerous and possibly open to > a policy of "set-and-forget" that might last for... years... (automatically > not re-issuing the certificate based on key-size + CSR timestamp would, I > think, create issues for CDNs as there would be no indication when a new > LURK/CSR cycle is needed). > > Am I reading it wrong / missing something ? > > Cheers, > Max > > -- > Massimiliano Pala, PhD > Director at OpenCA Labs > twitter: @openca > > _______________________________________________ > Acme mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme >
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