On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 7:39 PM, Salz, Rich <[email protected]> wrote:
> > https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/issues > > I'd prefer if we just recorded issues there, but discussed them in the > mailing list. I would prefer if we avoid getting into practices and policy issues there as well. An IETF working group has a finite lifetime and a limited constituency. Both make it a bad place to decide security policy. We write 'Security Considerations' not 'Security requirements'. Validation processes are like algorithms. The IETF can recommend but can't make a final decision. I think we all agree that it would be a bad thing if RFC5280 had made SHA-1 support a MUST and that this has in effect been superseded and this is a good thing. I don't think we are very likely to be changing crypto algorithms very frequently in the future. We seem to have a grip on those. But validation processes seem to me to be something that are not just likely to change, we would want to keep a watchful eye on. It isn't even the case that stronger validation mechanisms are necessarily better or necessarily necessary. We are going to a world where security is going to be required and insecurity becomes the exception. We are not going to a world where perfect security is required though. If 'some' security is required we can get rid of the low assurance security signal (aka padlock icon) and replace it with a danger signal. for no security.
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